## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BRIAN HOSCHEID,	)	
Plaintiff,	) ) Ciril Antion No. 40	
-VS-	) Civil Action No. 18	-208
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, <sup>1</sup> COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,	) ) )	
Defendant.	)	

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

#### **OPINION**

Pending before the court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 13 and 15). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 14 and 16). After careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below, I am denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 13) and granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 15).

#### I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income pursuant to the Social Security Act. Plaintiff filed his applications alleging he has been disabled since December 8, 2012. (ECF No. 9-7, pp. 2, 4). Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), Michael S. Kaczmarek, held a hearing on November 17, 2016. (ECF No. 9-2, pp. 30-57). On March 3, 2017, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (ECF No. 9-2, pp. 14-24).

After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this court. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 13 and 15). The issues are now ripe for review.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing Carolyn W. Colvin.

#### II. <u>LEGAL ANALYSIS</u>

#### A. Standard of Review

The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. *Allen v. Bowen,* 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate." *Ventura v. Shalala,* 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), *quoting Richardson v. Perales,* 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Additionally, the Commissioner's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); *Dobrowolsky v. Califano,* 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court cannot conduct a *de novo* review of the Commissioner's decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. *Palmer v. Apfel,* 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. *Hartranft v. Apfel,* 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the district court must review the record as a whole. *See,* 5 U.S.C. §706.

To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); *Brewster v. Heckler*, 786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).

The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment, whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant's impairments

prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4). *Dobrowolsky*, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful activity (step 5). *Id.* 

A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. *Podedworny v. Harris*, 745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).

#### B. Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC")<sup>2</sup>

Plaintiff submits that the ALJ's RFC determination of light work with a sit/stand option is "unreasonable" and remand is warranted. (ECF No. 14, pp. 5-8). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that it is "[un]reasonable to conclude he can stand/walk 4 to 6 hours in an 8-hour work shift at 5 days per week." *Id.* at p. 8. Plaintiff continues that if he was found to have an RFC of sedentary work, then he would be closely approaching advanced age and would be disabled per Grid Rule 201.14. *Id.* at 8.

While Plaintiff acknowledges that appeals are not meant to be a *de novo* review (ECF No. 14, p. 9), that is exactly what Plaintiff asks this court to do. To be clear, the standard is not whether there is evidence to establish Plaintiff's position. *Allen v. Bowen,* 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> RFC refers to the most a claimant can still do despite his/her limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The assessment must be based upon all of the relevant evidence, including the medical records, medical source opinions, and the individual's subjective allegations and description of his/her own limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). Additionally, a person's RFC is an administrative finding reserved for the ALJ, not a medical opinion to be rendered by a doctor. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527, 416.927; 20 C.F.R. §§404.1546(c), 416.946(c). In this case, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work with numerous physical exceptions. (ECF No. 9-2, p. 18).

[The] question is not whether substantial evidence supports Plaintiff's claims, or whether there is evidence that is inconsistent with the ALJ's finding.... Substantial evidence could support both Plaintiff's claims and the ALJ's findings because substantial evidence is less than a preponderance. *Jesurum v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services*, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (*citing Richardson v. Perales*, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). If substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding, it does not matter if substantial evidence also supports Plaintiff's claims. *Reefer v. Barnhart*, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003).

Weidow v. Colvin, Civ. No. 15-765, 2016 WL 5871164 at \*18 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2016). Thus, the question before me is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989).

As set forth above, substantial evidence has been defined as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate." *Ventura v. Shalala*, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), *quoting Richardson v. Perales*, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Additionally, the Commissioner's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); *Dobrowolsky v. Califano*, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). Thus, contrary to Plaintiff's desire, this court cannot conduct a *de novo* review of the Commissioner's decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. *Palmer v. Apfel*, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. *Hartranft v. Apfel*, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). Consequently, Plaintiff's entire argument is misplaced.

Nonetheless, I have reviewed the ALJ's RFC determination and find it is supported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 9-2, pp. 14-24). Therefore, I find no error in this regard and remand is not warranted.

An appropriate order shall follow.

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BRIAN HOSCHEID,	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
-VS-	)	Civil Action No. 18-208
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, <sup>3</sup> COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,	)	
Defendant.	)	

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

### **ORDER OF COURT**

THEREFORE, this 12<sup>th</sup> day of March, 2019, it is ordered that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 13) is denied and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 15) is granted.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Donetta W. AmbroseDonetta W. AmbroseUnited States Senior District Judge

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing Carolyn W. Colvin.